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Abstract
The study of fake real quadratic orders is fascinating as their class group structure is
similiar to real quadratic fields. Statistical data strongly agree with the heuristics of
Cohen and Lenstra of real quadratics with class number one. We will investigate why
this holds true as well as explore other analogues to open conjecture on real quadratic
fields, such as the Ankeny-Artin-Chowla Conjecture, and present various results that
mark the similiarities between real quadratic fields and fake real quadratic orders.
Fake real quadratics are defined by inverting an ideal above any prime p which is
split in OK where K = Q(
√
D) is an imaginary quadratic field.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Fake Real Quadratic Orders
The study of quadratic fields over the centuries produced extensive results as it is the
most basic of number fields over the rationals. These results are numerous, while cubic
fields and number fields with higher degrees lagged in progress as they present their
own challenges. However natural and tangible quadratic fields appear to be, there is
still quite a lot that is unknown. For example, it is expected there are infinitely many
real quadratic fields with class number 1. Although numerical data strongly suggests
this should be true, there has been little to no progress on establishing this result. The
Ankeny-Artin-Chowla conjecture is another open result regarding the fundamental
unit of real quadratic fields. It states the fundamental unit of a real quadratic field
of the form (a + b
√
D)/2 is given, then D - b. Extensive data have been generated
in attempts to provide convincing data or discover a counterexample. Despite the
fact no counterexamples have been found, it is believed by many that the conjecture
is false due to the “log log” argument which will be discussed further in Section 5.1.
In other words, we still have not searched far enough to find a counterexample. On
the other hand, similar results for imaginary quadratic fields have been proven since
they are slightly better understood. For example, it has been shown there are finitely
many imaginary quadratic fields with class number 1.
Henri Cohen suggested by inverting an ideal above any prime p which is split in
OK , where OK is the ring of integers for an imaginary quadratic field, it is a Dedekind
domain (which we will prove in the next section), thus allowing us to study its class
group structure. We will call this algebraic structure a fake real quadratic order.
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Cohen observed the class group structure of fake real quadratic orders have a similar
structure to class groups of real quadratic fields. We investigate further the properties
of the class group, the unit group, their asymptotics, and analogues to open questions
of real quadratic fields. We will demonstrate these fake real quadratic orders have
many similiarities to real quadratic fields, many of them evident while some less so.
1.1 Construction of Fake Real Quadratic Orders
Fix a prime number p. We take any fundamental discriminant D < 0 such that D
is a quadratic residue modulo p. Let K = Q(
√






= 1, we have that (p) = pp. We call the ring OK [p−1] a fake
real quadratic order, and let OK,p be the shorthand for it. The elements of OK,p
are elements γ ∈ Q(
√
D) such that vq(γ) ≥ 0 for all prime ideals q of OK , for q 6= p.
We note that the Galois conjugation induces a natural canonical isomorphism
between OK [p−1] and OK [p−1]. Therefore, we are able to simply write OK,p. Now,
OK,p is a ring, but more specifically, it is a OK-algebra. We will now show that OK,p
is a Dedekind domain, where Henri Cohen laid out a detailed sketch of the proof and
the author filled in the details.
Proposition 1.1. (Cohen) The ring OK,p is a Dedekind domain.
Proof. We can write OK,p =
⋃
k≥0
p−k. Therefore, if γ ∈ p−k, then there is a x such
that xpk ⊂ OK , where vq(x) ≥ 0 for all prime ideals q 6= p of OK . On the other hand,
if vq(x) ≥ 0 for all prime ideals q 6= p, then we are able to write that xOK = pm · a
for some m ∈ Z and some integral ideal a of OK , where a is coprime to p. Then we
have that x ∈ pm. Another way to stating this is pOK,p = OK,p.
Now, consider the following map:
ϕ : OK → OK,p
a 7→ aOK,p,
2
where a is from the set of integral ideals of OK coprime to p mapping to the set of
integral ideals of OK,p. We claim that this map is well-defined and is a bijection. We
can see clearly that aOK,p is an ideal of OK,p. Now, if aOK,p = bOK,p, then
ap−1 ⊂ bOK,p.
Thus,
a ⊂ bpOK,p = bOK,p,
which gives us vq(b) ≤ vq(a) for all prime ideals q 6= p. By a symmetric argument,
we get that vq(a) ≤ vq(b) for all prime ideals q 6= p. Therefore, a = b, since both a
and b are coprime to p, showing us that ϕ is injective.
Now, let I be an ideal of OK,p. Define a = I ∩ OK , which is an ideal of OK .
Trivally, we have that
aOK,p ⊂ IOK,p ∩ OK,p = I.
On the other hand, if x ∈ I, there is a k ≥ 0 such that x ∈ p−k, which means
xpk ⊂ OK , and xpk ⊂ I, since x ∈ I. Therefore,
x ∈ ap−k ⊂ aOK,p,
giving us that I = aOK,p. So, if a = pma′, where a′ is coprime to p, then
aOK,p = a′OK,p.
This gives us that ϕ is surjective, thus proving our claim. Since this is a bijection, the
generators of aOK,p are the same as a, thus all ideals of aOK,p are finitely generated.
Next, we will show every nonprime ideal is maximal. We claim the mapping
aOK,p ∩ OK = a
is a bijection, where a is an ideal of OK that is coprime to p. It is clear that this map
is injective since
aOK,p ∩ OK = a,
3
by the above argument.
To see surjectivity, consider x ∈ OK,p. If x ∈ OK , then it is the image of itself. If
x 6∈ OK , then we choose the smallest k > 0 such that xpk ⊂ OK . Since a is coprime
to pk, then there exists a ∈ a and u ∈ pk such that a + u = 1, so that x = ax + ux,
where ax ∈ aOK,p and ux ∈ OK . Therefore, x is the image of ux modulo aOK,p.
From this isomorphism, we see that aOK,p is a prime ideal if and only if a is a
prime ideal different from p of OK . Similarly, we can say that aOK,p is a maximal
ideal if and only if a is a maximal ideal of OK , again not being p. This means that
the prime ideals of OK,p are either 0 or qOK,p for all prime ideals q 6= p of OK . Thus,
every nonzero prime ideal is maximal.
Finally, we need to show that OK,p is integrally closed. Consider the following
monic polynomial of degree n
P (X) = Xn + an−1Xn−1 + . . .+ a1X + a0,
where ai ∈ OK,p, and there is a x ∈ K such that P (x) = 0. If q 6= p is a prime ideal
of OK , then
vq(ai · xi) ≥ i · vq(x),
and
vq(xn) = n · vq(x).
So, if vq(x) < 0, then
vq(ai · xi) > n · vq(x),
which means that the q-valuation for the lead coefficient will not be able to cancel
for the rest of the coefficients giving us P (x) 6= 0. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be vq(x) ≥ 0, giving us x ∈ OK,p, which shows OK,p is integrally
closed. Since all the conditions have been satisifed, this shows that OK,p is a Dedekind
domain.
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1.2 The Unit and Class Groups of Fake Real Quadratics
Since OK,p is a Dedekind domain, we can study its unit and class groups. In this
section, we build up the structure of both the unit and class group and explicity define
what elements in these respective groups look like. All the results in this sections are
attributed to Henri Cohen. Note that this establishes an analogy with unit and class
groups of real quadratic fields.
Proposition 1.2. (Cohen) Let UK,p denote the unit group of OK,p. Then UK,p =
µK × εZ, where µK is the group of roots of unity in K, and the fundamental unit ε is
the generator of the principal ideal po(p), where o(p) is the order of the ideal p in the
ideal class group ClK.
Proof. We have that γ ∈ UK,p if and only if vq(γ) ≥ 0 and vq(1/γ) ≥ 0 for all prime
ideals q 6= p. Therefore, γ ∈ UK,p if and only if vq(γ) = 0 for all q 6= p. In order for
vq(γ) = 0, it must be that γOK = pk for some k ∈ Z. By the definition of o(p), the
order of the ideal p in the ideal class group ClK , this is only possible if and only if
o(p)|k.
This means that γOK = (εOK)k/o(p). In other words, γ = ηεk/o(p), for η being
some unit in OK . Since the only group of units in OK is µK , the roots of unity, since
K is an imaginary quadratic field, we get the statement that γ ∈ UK,p if and only if
γ = ηεk/o(p). Therefore, UK,p = µK × εZ.
Next, we explore what the ideal class group of OK,p looks like and define the class
number.
Proposition 1.3. (Cohen) The class group ClK,p of OK,p is canonicallly isomorphic
to ClK /〈p〉, where ClK is the ideal class group of K and 〈p〉 is the cyclic group
generated by the ideal p. Thus, hK,p = |ClK,p | = hK/o(p).
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Proof. Consider the map
ϕ : ClK → ClK,p
[a] 7→ [aOK,p],
where [a] is an ideal class in ClK and [aOK,p] is an ideal class of ClK,p. This map is a
well-defined group homomorphism. We have from the proof of Proposition 1.1 that
ideals of OK,p have the form aOK,p, it is clear to see that this map is surjective.
We have already seen that the map a 7→ aOK,p is an injective map for all ideals
coprime to p. Thus, if aOK,p = xOK,p for some x ∈ OK . The a = xpk for some k ∈ Z.
This means that the kernel of the map ϕ is the cyclic group generated by the ideal a
that minimizes k. Thus, by the Fundamental Isomorphism Theorem,
OK/〈p〉 ∼= OK,p. (1.1)
The fact that hK,p = hK/o(p) follows immediately from this isomorphism.
We would like a specific representation of elements inside of OK,p. The following
lemma gives us representations of these elements. For simplicity, we will assume that





= 1, there exists a ∈ Z such that D ≡ a2 (mod p).
Fixing one of the two possible values of a modulo p is equivalent to choosing between
p and p. Therefore, without loss of generality we will let
p = pZ + (a+
√
D)Z.
Lemma 1.4. (Cohen) Let α = x+y
√
D ∈ OK, with x, y ∈ (12)Z and gcd(x, y, p) = 1.
Then for k > 0, we have that α ∈ pk if and only if pk|x2−D ·y2 and x ≡ ay (mod p).
Proof. To see sufficiency, let α ∈ pk. Then N(p)k|N(α). Since α = x+y
√
D, we have
N(α) = x2 −D · y2. Therefore,
pk|x2 −D · y2.
6
If k > 0, then α ∈ p, so
α = pu+ (a+
√
D)v
= (pu+ av) + v ·
√
D.
So, x = pu+ av and y = v. Thus,
x = av + pu ≡ av = ay (mod p).
Thus, x ≡ ay (mod p).
For necessity, assume that pk|x2 − D · y2 and x ≡ ay (mod p). Since k > 0 so
p|N(α). Then either α ∈ p or α ∈ p. But if




α = pu+ (a−
√
D)v,
for u, v ∈ Z. This gives us x = pu+ av and y = −v. So
x = pu+ av ≡ av = −ay (mod p).
Therefore 2x ≡ D (mod p). Since we assume that p 6= 2, this gives us p|x. Now,





= 1 and p|(x2 − Dy2) implies that p|y, but this contradicts
our assumption the gcd(x, y, p) = 1.
Therefore, α ∈ p and vp(α) = 0, so vp(N(α)) = vp(α) giving us the fact that
α ∈ pk.
This implies the following corollary regarding the representation of elements in
OK,p.
Corollary 1.5. (Cohen) The elements of OK,p can be written in a unique way. Specif-
ically if γ ∈ OK,p, then






where k ∈ Z, x, y ∈ (12)Z, gcd(x, y, p) = 1, and either k ≤ 0 (i.e. γ ∈ OK) or k > 0,
which must mean that pk|x2 −D · y2 and x ≡ −ay (mod p).
Proof. Since pkγ ⊆ OK for some k ∈ Z, we have that pkγ ∈ OK . Therefore,





Since we can always divide out the largest power of p from gcd(x, y), we can further
assume that gcd(x, y, p) = 1. Therefore, this representation will be unique.
On the other hand, if k ≤ 0, then γ ∈ OK ⊂ OK,p, so there are no other conditions.




By Lemma 1.4 applied to p, this statement is equivalent to pk|x2−D ·y2 and x ≡ −ay
(mod p).
We see here that the unit and class groups of OK,p in this situation is analogous to
the real quadratic field case. With this construction, we see that fake real quadratic
orders have unit groups of rank one. Also, with the class group having parallels with
real quadratics, we seek to find an asymptotic formula involving the class number as
the discriminant varies. Therefore, it would be interesting to test out open conjec-
tures that exist regarding real quadratics in this setting. We will discuss two open
conjectures and their analogues to fake real quadratics in Section 4 and 5.
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1.3 Chebotarev Density Theorem
Before going into the class number formula and giving some asymptotics, we need to
discuss the Chebotarev Density Theorem. The Chebotarev density theorem describes
the statistical behavior of splitting of primes in a given Galois extension K of Q of
rational numbers. Let K be a quadratic field, and ClK be the class group of K. Let
H be the Hilbert class field of the quadratic field K, which is the maximal unramified
abelian extension of K. Let nH = [H : Q]. By Class Field Theory, Gal(H/K) ' ClK .
Let C be an element of Gal(H/K). Let πC count the number of primes in Q that
split in K such that NK/Q(p) < X and p is represented by the element C in the class
group ClK .
πC(X) = #{p : p prime, p is represented by C, and NK/Q(p) ≤ X}.




· Li(X) = 1
h(D) · Li(X), as X →∞







logX , as X →∞.
In 1977, Lagarias and Odlyzko [17] gave two versions of the Chebotarev density
theorem, both having effective and computable error bounds with respect to X, h(D),
D, and 1/|ClK |. The unconditional bound is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.6. (Lagarias, Odlyzko) There are effective computable constants c1 and
c2 such that if
x ≥ exp(10 · h(D) log2(|D|)),
then∣∣∣∣∣πC(X)− 1|ClK | · Li(X)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1|Cl(D)| ·Li(Xβ0)+c1 ·X ·exp(−c2 ·h(D)−1/2 ·(logX)1/2),
(1.2)
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where β0 is a Siegel zero. Note that if h(D) = 1, there is no zero in this range.
In order to make sure that Theorem 1.6 has an error term that only depends on
X, h(D), D, and 1/|ClK |, we need a uniform bound for β0. We give the following
theorem for completeness of the unconditional effective bound.
Theorem 1.7. (Lagarias, Odlyzko) Let the notation be the same as the previous
theorem. If the Hilbert class field H of the number field K is normal over Q, then
mH = 4. Let mH = 16 if there is a sequence of fields
Q = K0 ⊂ K1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Kr = H,
which each field being normal over the preceding one. Otherwise, let mH = 4 · h(D)!.
Then there is a computable and effective constant c3 such that
β0 < max[1− (mH · log |D|)−1, 1− (c3 · |D|1/h(D))−1].
Therefore, we have an unconditional, effective error bound to the Chebotarev
density theorem. We also have a version of Chebotarev density theorem that assumes
GRH.
Theorem 1.8. (Lagarias, Odlyzko) Assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis
holds true, there is an effective, computable positive absolute constant c4 such that for





·X1/2 · log(|D| ·Xh(D)) + log |D|
)
. (1.3)
As the study of fake real quadratic orders require the parameters p and D, the
distribution of primes is important. Thus the above two formulas are significant in
our studies as we desire to study the behavior of the class number as p varies with
D.
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1.4 Class Number Formula
One of the common themes in number theory is special values of L-functions encode
arithmetic information. The Dirichlet class number formula is a famous example of
using L-functions to compute the class number of a number field. For imaginary




|D| · L(1, χD)
2π , (1.4)
where ω denote the automorphs of binary quadratic forms of discriminant D or the





2 : D < −4
4 : D = −4
6 : D = −3.
(1.5)
For real quadratic fields, the Dirichlet class number formula is
h(D) =
√
D · L(1, χD)
log ε , (1.6)
where ε is the fundamental unit for Q(
√
D).
In this section, we will prove the analogue to the Dirichlet class number formula
for fake real quadratic orders. This will allow us to investigate asymptotics of class
numbers for fake real quadratics and compare similarities to real quadratic fields. In
this section, we will denote OK,p as OD,p, where K = Q(
√
D). This will allow us to
define asymptotics in relation to D.





|D| · L(1, χD)
2π · logpN(εD,p)
,
where ω is the same as defined in (4.3) and εD,p is the fundamental unit of O×D,p.
11




|D| · L(1, χD)
2π .
By Proposition 1.3, we know that the class group is canonically isomorphic to ClD /〈p〉
and h(D, p) = h(D)/o(p). Therefore,








We use the classical technique of multiplying by 1, which in this case we will multiply
by log plog p which gives us
ω ·
√












Since εD,p, the fundamental unit of OD,p, is a generator for the principal ideal po(p),
we know logp po(p) = N(εD,p). Therefore,
ω ·
√





|D| · L(1, χD)
2π · logpN(εD,p)
.
This gives us the desired class number formula for fake real quadratics.
We would like to investigate some asymptotics on h(D, p). We need the following
lemma before we get to our theorem.










where ord(C) is the order of class C in the ideal class group Cl(D).
Proof. There are only finitely many class groups of order 1 for negative fundamental
discriminants. Therefore, the worst possible situation is the ideal class group is
isomorphic to the product of cyclic groups of order 2. In other words, all elements
12
have order 2 except the identity. Therefore, given a fundamental discriminant of an
imaginary quadratic field, if the class group is isomorphic to the product of cyclic
groups of order 2, then the number of elements of order 2 is h(D)− 1. Therefore, the
sum of 1ord(C) over all elements of order 2 is
(h(D)− 1) · 12 .
By accounting for the identity element, we have that the upper bound over all ele-
ments in Cl(D) is
(h(D)− 1) · 12 + 1 =
h(D) + 1
2 .
It is possible to improve this bound given here by looking at the bound on 2-torsion
elements from Cox on Gauss genus theory [9] and bound on 3-torsion elements from
Ellenberg and Venkatesh’s Reflection Principles [12].

























= 1 and second summation is over all primes that split in K over Q
such that NK/Q(p) < Y , where both X and Y are large.


























p rep by C
1.
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By the Chebotarev Density Theorem, we know the primes that split in K are evenly
represented in the class group. More specifically,
∑
NK/Q(p)<Y
p rep by C
1 ∼ 1
h(D) · Li(Y ).





















The average value for the class number for imaginary quadratic fields, given by







Furthermore, the number of negative fundamental discriminants, given by Bhargava









































Fundamental Unit for Fake Real Quadratic
Orders
The fundamental unit is a generator modulo the roots of unity for the unit group of
the ring of integers of a number field. For real quadratic fields Q(
√
D) where D is a
fundamental discriminant, then the fundamental unit is




where the pair (a, b) is the smallest solution to the Pell equation
x2 −Dy2 = ±4.
The classical method to compute the fundamental unit for real quadratic fields in-
volves the computation of the continued fractions expansion for
√
D. For fake real
quadratic orders, there is no analogous method has yet to be found. Therefore, in the
subsequent sections, we will discuss two methods to compute the fundamental unit
for fake real quadratic orders. The algorithms are implemented in SAGE [24] and the
code in their entirety can be found in the Appendices.
2.1 Method 1: Brute Force
The first method to compute the fundamental unit requires the knowledge of the
class number h(D) for the given imaginary quadratic field and pre-computation of
the factors of the class number h(D) = h = ∏mi=0 peii , where k is the number of distinct
prime divisors.
15






Output: εK,p, fundmental unit for OK,p, where K = Q(
√
D).
Assume: h(D) = h, the class number for K has been pre-computed, and the factor-
ization h = ∏mi=0 peii has been found.
1. Factor (p) = pp.
2. List all the possible divisors in ascending order of h. Let L = {di}τ(h)i=1 , where di
is a divisor of h.
3. Compute pdi, starting with i = 0
4. If pdi is principal, then di is the order of p. Return pdi as the fundamental unit.
If it is not principal, then i = i+ 1, and return to Step 3.
Since we assume for this algorithm the value h(D) has been computed and fac-
tored already, this algorithm has low complexity. In practice, the computing of the
class number and factoring it is non-trivial and is a different computational problem.
Hence, this algorithm is only practical when h(D) is small or when |D| is small. We
note that this method is not the most efficient method to compute the order for p.
It would be quicker to look at L = {h/pki }e
i
k=1 to get the order. If the class number is
unknown, the method discussed in the following section may be a better alternative.
2.2 Method 2: Binary Quadratic Forms
The following method employs the use of binary quadratic forms. We start with a
brief summary of binary quadratic forms before discussing the algorithm, but the
author recommends Buell’s Binary Quadratic Forms: Classical Theory and Modern
Computations [4] for further reading on this topic. Let Q(x, y) = Ax2 + Bxy + Cy2
be a binary quadratic form with discriminant D = B2− 4AC. We use the shorthand
Q = (A,B,C) for the binary quadratic form Q(x, y) = Ax2 +Bxy+Cy2. A principal
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ideal has a binary quadratic form that is SL2(Z) equivalent to a principal binary
quadratic form.
Definition 2.2. Let D be a discriminant. Then the principal binary quadratic form




: D ≡ 0 (mod 4)(
1, 1,−D − 14
)





 ∈ SL2(Z), where αδ − βγ = +1. Let Q = (A,B,C) be a binary
quadratic form with discriminant D. We say M acts on Q on the right by
Q ◦M = Q(αX + βY, γX + δY ).




Then the matrix M acts on Q by M−1QM = S, where S is an imaginary binary
quadratic form with discriminant D. We say Q and Q′ are equivalent forms when
there is M ∈ SL2(Z) with Q ◦M = Q′.
Before we outline the steps to compute the fundamental unit, we define powering
up a binary quadratic form as repeatedly using Gauss’s composition on a form Q,
which is well-defined up to equivalence. For example, we say Q powered up 3 times
as Q3 = Q ◦Q ◦Q.
Algorithm 2.3. Inputs: p prime, D fundamental discriminant.




















= 1, then there exists a binary quadratic form Q = (p, b, c) such that
b2 − 4pc = D. [9] In order to find this form, we first compute the b coefficient,




3. Starting with i = 1, compute Qi.
4. Check if Qi is equivalent to the principal form of discriminant D. If not, then
i = i + 1 and return to Step 3. If Qi is principal, then let m = i and go to the
next step.
5. Let Qm = (pm, b′, c′) which has been verified in Step 4, is equivalent to the
principal form P = (a, b, c). Compute the solution (x, y) such that
Ax2 +Bxy + Cy2 = pm.






This algorithm could be made more efficient during Steps 3 and 4. Rather than
powering up with increments of a single power in each step, we can employ Shanks’
baby-step-giant-step approach [22] to reduce the number of multiplications. Since
the reduced binary quadratic forms of a given negative discriminant form a group,
Shanks’ baby-step-giant-step approach uses a meet-in-the-middle method to find the
principal form. The time-memory trade-off can be performed with O(
√
n) group
multiplications rather than the brute force’s O(n) group multiplications, where n is
the size of the group. The complexity of the algorithm is discussed in further depth
in the following section.
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2.3 Algorithm Complexity
Algorithm complexity quantifies the amount of time it takes for an algorithm to run
as a function of the input. The time complexity is given in big O notation, which
mean the complexity is described asymptotically, i.e. as the input size goes to infinity.
For example, an algorithm runs on linear time has O(n) where n is the input, and
O(2n) is called exponential time. An algorithm is said to be polynomial time if
the running time has an upper bound with a polynomial expression, i.e. O(nk). We
note that the Euclidean algorithm for computing the greatest common divisor of
two integers runs in polynomial time. This is polynomial with respect to the binary
representation of integer n and m. The inputs n and m have binary representation
of roughly log n+ logm. The Euclidean algorithm runs in O((log n+ logm)2), which
is polynomial with respect to log n+ logm.
We will discuss the algorithm complexity of recovering the fundamental unit
through the use of binary quadratic forms. To see the SAGE program, see Appendix
A. Let D < 0 be a fundamental discriminant and p be a given fixed prime. The





= 1, which is equivalent to the complexity of the Euclidean
algorithm.
The next step is to find the binary quadratic form of discriminant D such that
a = p, or in other words, Q = (p, b, c) where b2− 4pc = D. This step is costliest since
it requires calculating a modular square root, or in other words find b such that
b2 ≡ D (mod p). (2.2)
The complexity of finding such a modular square root is discussed in Section 2.4. In
section 2.4, we will explain that by assuming GRH, we will have polynomial time.
In step 3, we power up Q by repeatedly using Gauss’s composition law. The
complexity for composing two forms is equivalent to using the Euclidean algorithm
twice. It costs one Euclidean for getting the form, while it costs another Euclidean for
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reducing the form and checking to see if the power is principal. Therefore, this step
can be done in polynomial time with respect to |D|. We would like to iterate the use
of Shanks’ little-step-giant-step algorithm can reduce the number of multiplications
necessary to reach the principal form by generating the powers of binary quadratic
form Q in a more efficient, organized manner.
Assume that the order of the binary quadratic form Q in the ideal class group ClK
is k. Then after step 3, we have the binary quadratic form Qk = (pk, B, C) which
reduces to the principal form (A′, B′, C ′). Using an extended Euclidean algorithm
computation, we get the representation of pk by the principal form (i.e. find (x, y)
such that A′x2 + B′xy + C ′y2 = pk.) We complete the square and factor to recover
the fundamental unit.
In the worst case, our algorithm will cost us 1 expensive computation of the square
root modulo p and 2
√
|D| Euclidean algorithm computations. If we assume GRH,
our computation of the modular square root can be done in polynomial time, giving
us the complexity to recover the fundamental unit in polynomial time with respect
to
√
|D|. In the following section, we will discuss the expensive calculation of the
modular square root and show examples of how it can be used.
2.4 Computation of Modular Square Roots
As stated in the previous section, the most computationally intensive step of com-
puting the fundamental unit of a fake real quadratic order is calculating a modular
square root, or given integers n and m, find a solution for the following equation:
x2 ≡ n (mod m).
Since the n value is our fundamental discriminant D and m = p is prime, we are
trying to find solutions to x2 ≡ D (mod p). One method to find such a square root
modulo a prime is to use the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm [23]. The algorithm solves
20






recover a solution to
x2 ≡ D (mod p).
Algorithm 2.4.
Step 1: Let M be an integer greater than or equal to 0 such that 2M ||(p− 1), and let
p− 1 = R · 2M ,
where R ≡ 1 (mod 2). If M = 1, then p ≡ 3 (mod 4). In this case, we are able to
compute directly the solutions to x2 ≡ D (mod p) by directly calculating
R = ±D(p+1)/4 mod p.
Step 2: In this step, we need a quadratic nonresidue element modulo p. In other






C ≡ zR (mod p).
Step 3: Set
T ≡ D(R+1)/2 (mod p),
P ≡ DR (mod p),
U = M.
Step 4: Iterate over the following loop:
1. If P ≡ 1 (mod p), return the value T . T is the square root of D modulo p and
our desired solution.
2. Otherwise, find the smallest j where 0 < j < U such that
p2
j ≡ 1 (mod p).
Note this step can be accomplished efficiently by repeated squaring and reduction
modulo p.
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3. Let B ≡ C2M−j−1 (mod p), and compute the following:
T ≡ T ·B (mod p),
P ≡ B2 (mod p),
C ≡ B2 (mod p),
U = j.
Return to Step 1.
Once we have recovered the value T , the second solution to our modular square root
is p− T .
The complexity of the algorithm is
2d+ 2k + M(M − 1)4 +
1
2M−1 − 9
modular multiplications where d is the number of digits in the binary representation
of p and k is the number of ones in the binary representation of p, and M is the
same as above, the largest nonzero exponent of 2 that divides p − 1 exactly. This
is the average complexity of Tonelli-Shanks over all possible inputs involving both
quadratic residues and nonresidues.
In our algorithm, we need a quadratic nonresidue. One method is to randomly
select a value y and check whether it is a nonresidue. This should take on average
about 2 computations of the Legendre symbol, which costs about 2 Euclidean al-
gorithm computations each [25]. The reason why we expect on average 2 of these









which is less than 1 but greater than 12 . Therefore on average, selecting 2 elements
from {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} should result in finding a quadratic nonresidue. By assuming
GRH, recovering a nonresidue can be done in polynomial time [1].
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In conclusion, Tonelli-Shanks is a great choice for solving x2 ≡ D (mod p) when
M from p−1 = R ·2M is small relative to the number of digits in the binary expansion
of p. Alternatively for large M , Cipolla’s algorithm is proven to be more efficient in
[25] if and only if
M(M − 1) > 8M + 20.
2.5 Example of Tonelli-Shanks algorithm
We will show two separate examples illustrating the computation of the Tonelli-
Shanks algorithm for computing a square root modulo a prime.
Example 1
We will solve x2 ≡ −23 (mod 13). We satisfy the conditions to use Tonelli-Shanks






(−23)(13−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod 13).
Step 1:
We have M = 2 since p− 1 = 13− 1 = 12 = 3 · 22, so R = 3.
Step 2:






C ≡ zR ≡ 23 ≡ 8 (mod 13).
Step 3:
Let
T ≡ D(R+1)/2 ≡ (−23)(3+1)/2 ≡ 9 (mod 13),
P ≡ DR ≡ (−23)3 ≡ 1 (mod 13),
U = M = 2.
Step 4:
Since P ≡ 1 (mod 13), we stop our loop and return T = 9.
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The other solution to x2 ≡ −23 (mod 13) is p − T = 13 − 9 = 4. This example
does not illustrate properly the use of the loop in Step 4, so now we will attempt to
solve x2 ≡ 10 (mod 13).
Example 2






10(13−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod 13).
Step 1:
Since p− 1 = 13− 1 = 12 = 3 · 22, our R = 3 and M = 2 like from above.
Step 2:
We will use the same quadratic nonreside z = 2 and set
C ≡ zR ≡ 23 ≡ 8 (mod 13).
Step 3:
Set
T ≡ D(R+1)/2 ≡ 10(3+1)/2 ≡ −4 (mod 13),
P ≡ DR ≡ 103 ≡ −1 (mod 13),
U = M = 2.
Since T 6≡ 1 (mod 13), we take j from 0 < j < 2. We start with j = 1. Let
• Let
B ≡ C2M−j−1 ≡ 822−1−1 ≡ 8 (mod 13),
which means
B2 ≡ 82 ≡ −1 (mod 13).
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• Set
T ≡ T ·B ≡ −4 · 8 ≡ 7 (mod 13),
P ≡ B2 ≡ (−1)2 ≡ 1 (mod 13),
U = 1.
We restart the loop. Since P ≡ 1 (mod 13), we return T = 7. The other solution is
p− T = 13− 7 = 6.
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Chapter 3
Mean Number of Three Torsion Elements
In this chapter, we explore the number of three torsion elements in the class group
of fake real quadratic orders.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a finite Abelian group and let γ ∈ G. Then γ is a 3-torsion
element if and only if γ3 = 1G, where 1G is the identity element of G. Another way
to say this is o(γ)|3 (i.e. o(γ) = 1 or 3), where o(γ) is the order of γ in the group G.
The classical theorems of Davenport and Heilbronn [10] state the asymptotic
formulas for the total number of 3-torsion elements in the ideal class group of the
quadratic fields with a bounded discriminant.
Theorem 3.2. (Davenport, Heilbronn) Let D denote the discriminant of a quadratic











1 + o(X); (3.1)∑
−X<D<0
|Cl3(D)| = 2 ·
∑
−X<D<0
1 + o(X). (3.2)
3.1 3-Torsion Elements in Fake Real Quadratic Orders
Since we have shown that the class group of fake real quadratics share similar class
group structures as real quadratic fields, it would be safe to assume the average
number of 3-torsion elements in fake real quadratic class groups would be 43 . The
following theorem shows this fact is true, and the fields share this same property
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when averaged simultaneously over D and p. That is, when D and p are sufficiently
large, the desired result occurs.
Theorem 3.3. (O.) Let OD,p denote the fake real quadratic order derived from the
imaginary quadratic field Q(
√
D) and prime p where D is a quadratic residue modulo














where the error bound assuming GRH is
O((XY )1/2 · log2 X +XY 1/2 · log Y ). (3.4)
Before we prove this, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 3.4. Let G be a finite Abelian group, and let r3(G) denote the 3-rank of
G. Let 〈a〉 denote a cyclic subgroup generated by a ∈ G. Then if a ∈ G is chosen
at random with probability 1|G| , then the average value of |Tor3(G/〈a〉)| is
3r3(G) + 2
3 ,
where Tor(A) represents the 3-torsion subgroup of group G.
Proof. Let r3(G) = k. By the fundamental theorem of finitely generated abelian
groups, we have G/〈1〉 ' G, the group of order k. There are 3k − 1 elements a ∈ G
where a 6= 1G that will generate G/〈a〉, which is a subgroup of 3k−1. Therefore,
since each element of G has a 1|G| probability of being chosen, the average size of the
3-torsion subgroup will be
3k · 13k + 3
k−1 · 3
k − 1





By the Davenport-Heilbronn Theorem, the mean number of 3-torsion elements for
imaginary quadratic fields is 2. Another way to state this is
∞∑
k=0
Prob(k) · 3k = 2,
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where Prob(k) represents the probability that r3(Cl(D)) = k, and Cl(D) denotes the
ideal class group for an imaginary quadratic field for −X < D < 0. Since Lemma
3.4 states that the average size of the 3-torsion subgroup of a finite Abelian group
modulo a random cyclic subgroup is 3r3(G)+23 , the mean number of 3-torsion elements


























Prob(k)(3k − 1) = 1,





































= 43 . (3.5)
Now, we can prove our theorem on hand.
















Using the fact that half the primes in Q(
√









1 = 43 ·
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4.1 Class Number Problem
One of the most prominent open conjectures of real quadratic fields started with the
class number problems proposed by Gauss. In 1801, he discussed and proposed two
conjectures in regards to imaginary quadratic fields and stated a third conjecture for
real quadratic fields.
Conjecture 4.1. (Gauss) Let D < 0, and let h(D) denote the class number for
Q(
√
D). Then h(D) tends to ∞ as D tends to −∞.
This result was proven by Heilbronn [14] in 1934. This beautiful statement does
not shed light on how many fields have a particular class number since his proof
proved an ineffective lower bound for h(D). Gauss’s second conjecture on imaginary
quadratic fields attempts to answer the question of how many.
Conjecture 4.2. (Gauss) Given n, there are finitely many imaginary quadratic fields
with class number n.
Heilbronn and Linfoot [15], in 1934, proved that there are at most 10 imaginary
quadratic fields with class number 1, with 9 of those fields being known at that time
and one unknown. Through recent developements, Watkins [27], in 2004, gave a
exhaustive list of all imaginary quadratic fields for all class numbers up to 100.
Dealing with imaginary quadratic fields is different and is considered generally
easier to deal with than real quadratic fields. We will go into slightly more depth on
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why imaginary quadratic fields are easier to deal with than real quadratics in a later
section. It is evident to see that it is true with the following open problem.
Conjecture 4.3. (Gauss) There are infinitely many real quadratic fields with class
number one.
It is assumed that this conjecture is true, although there have been no great ad-
vances in establishing its validity. It is obvious to see the difference between real
versus imaginary quadratic fields as we know there are exactly 9 fundamental dis-
criminants of imaginary quadratic fields with class number one. Not much progress
has been made in regards to this conjecture.
One of the reasons that this problem contrasts sharply is the class number formula
of each respective type of quadratic field.
4.2 Class Number Formula for Real and Imaginary Quadratic Fields
Recall the class number formula for real quadratic fields is
h(D) =
√
D · L(1, χD)
log ε . (4.1)









2 : D < −4
4 : D = −4
6 : D = −3.
(4.3)
Inspecting the two contrasting formulas, we see that the analytic formula for class
number for real quadratic fields has an extra factor of log ε in the formula. This
extra factor makes it harder to control. Although it is well believed that there are
infinitely many real quadratic fields with class number one, there has been very little
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progress made on this. The heuristic argument of Cohen and Lenstra where they
produced probabilistic arguments on which Abelian groups occur naturally is a major
conjecture regarding real quadratic fields with class number one. These probabilities
are weighted by the size of these automorphism groups.
Conjecture 4.4. (Cohen, Lenstra) The proportion of real quadratic fields with prime




(1− 2−k)−1ζ(k)−1 = 0.754458 . . . .
In general, the proportion of those class groups to a given Abelian group G should be
proportional to
C
|G| · |Aut(G)| ,
where Aut(G) is the group of automorphisms of G.
4.3 Heuristics for Fake Real Quadratic Orders
Although the data strongly shows the similarity, Cohen makes a clear statement
about the difficulty of producing an asymptotic since the data set is small, and the
convergence to this limit is slow. The ability to differentiate between large powers
of log versus small powers of x is quite difficult. Based on Cohen’s data from an
unpublished manuscript, he states that the asymptotic for the secondary term could
be
0.754458 . . .+ 230
log3(x)
,
but it could also be
0.754458 . . .+ 0.505
x1/5
.
Regardless, the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics seem to hold true numerically. We give
the following analogue for fake real quadratic orders.
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= 1 of which hK,p = 1, where K = Q(
√
D) is the imaginary quadratic
field, exists and is equal to C = 0.754458 . . ..
This conjecture is a natural implication since the class group of a real quadratic
field is isomorphic to G/〈σ〉, where G is an abelian group and σ is a randomly chosen
element from G [8]. Fake real quadratic orders have the same structure. The class
group has structure ClK /〈p〉, where ClK is the class group of an imaginary quadratic
field and p is a randomly chosen element of the class group which represents an
element of the class group. Thus, this conjecture is implied from what Cohen and
Lenstra originally conjectured regarding quadratic fields.
Here are the tables to the modest limit of 226 of the proportion of fake real
quadratic orders with D ≡ 3 (mod 4) with class number hK,p = 1. The convergence
of the fake real quadratic is consistent with the real quadratic fields the proportion
is the far right column of both tables.
Table 4.1 Ratio of Prime Discriminants D ≡ 1 (mod 4) of Fake Real Quadratics
with hK,p = 1: Part 1
2 3 5 7 11 Real
214 .833232 .820886 .826853 .827565 .823529 .810597
215 .807906 .805917 .812256 .803711 .806630 .808206
216 .806424 .794974 .808407 .794414 .796014 .795179
217 .795764 .794199 .791770 .790069 .794188 .793950
218 .789878 .787790 .788826 .786843 .784353 .789673
219 .782992 .784135 .783784 .782650 .778906 .784095
220 .780740 .780362 .779968 .778748 .776097 .777829
221 .776594 .776978 .775072 .772542 .771588 .774867
222 .773628 .772959 .772230 .771919 .770220 .772734
223 .770983 .771040 .770584 .770025 .769845 .770283
224 .768857 .768855 .768615 .768377 .767820 .768519
225 .767230 .766897 .766656 .766279 .765958 .766459
226 .765842 .765504 .765098 .764852 .763370 .764857
The figure following the table places the information found in the table in a
visually appealing graph.
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Table 4.2 Ratio of Prime Discriminants D ≡ 1 (mod 4) of Fake Real Quadratics
with hK,p = 1: Part 2
13 17 19 23 29 Real
214 .816413 .798417 .818237 .795745 .819682 .810597
215 .805951 .795912 .794060 .802812 .810705 .808206
216 .804747 .796138 .793235 .795851 .799757 .795179
217 .792229 .789720 .787567 .791605 .790901 .793950
218 .783438 .789030 .782039 .787057 .786245 .789673
219 .779968 .783448 .779649 .782491 .778906 .784095
220 .777067 .778146 .776277 .778748 .776097 .777829
221 .773423 .773714 .773678 .772542 .771588 .774867
222 .771451 .770931 .771173 .769554 .770261 .772734
223 .769238 .769426 .768673 .767680 .767901 .770283
224 .767576 .767239 .766869 .765940 .766849 .768519
225 .765572 .765256 .765058 .764624 .764370 .766459
226 .764243 .763984 .764104 .763558 .763370 .764857





This section is credited to Henri Cohen. His work investigated the analogue to the
Ankeny-Artin-Chowla conjecture for fake real quadratic orders. He computed the
counterexamples, but the author computed the fundamental unit counterexamples
and placed them in the Appendix.
5.1 Conjecture for Real Quadratic Fields
The Ankeny-Artin-Chowla Conjecture (AAC for short) is a divisibility result involving
the fundmental unit with the discriminant of the field. Specifically, let K = Q(
√
D)
be a real quadratic field with prime discriminant D such that D ≡ 1 (mod 4). Then
the fundamental unit of K has the form




The AAC Conjecture asserts that D - b. As previously stated in the introduction,
this conjecture is still an open problem, although extensive numerical data has been
generated over the years which confirms the truth for D < X. Table 5.1 gives the
progression of verification since its proposal in 1952, and the most recent result given
by van der Poorten, Williams, et al., verifying the conjecture to be true forD < 2·1011.
We must mention that although there are effective and “fast” methods to compute
the fundamental unit for real quadratic fields, the computations can be extremely
memory intensive. For example, for discriminant D = 40, 094, 470, 441, the a and b
values of the fundamental unit exceed 10330000 [26]. The work of van der Poorten,
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p ≡ 5 (mod 8) only 1952
100 000 Goldberg 1954
6 279 714 Beach, Williams, Zarnke 1971
100 028 010 Soleng 1986
1 000 000 000 Stephens, Williams 1988
200 000 000 000 van der Poorten, te Riele, Williams 2000
Williams, et al designed special equipment and algorithms to minimize the memory
load in order to verify as far as they did. To most, the value of X = 2 · 1011 might
seem like a very large number, so it might seem convincing that this conjecture may
be true. Despite the lack of a counterexample, there are many who believe this
conjecture is false. The “log log” argument is a popular explanation why the AAC
conjecture may be false. One way to state this argument is we have nothing to show








should tell us how many counterexamples we should expect for a given X value. The
integral from (5.1) is of the order of 12 log logX, where the
1
2 accounts for the D ≡ 1
(mod 4) condition. So even for the “large” value X = 2 · 1011, it is expected to
have 1.39 counterexamples. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that there have been
no counterexamples found even for this large of an X value.
5.2 Analogue Conjecture for fake real quadratic orders
Since we believe fake real quadratic orders behave the same as real quadratic fields, it
would be interesting to study the analogue to the AAC conjecture and see if it holds
up the same way. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are counterexamples. The following
counterexamples are given by Cohen [7]. The simpliest of all of them is p = 7 and
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D = −3. For K = Q(
√
−3), the class number h(−3) = 1. Therefore, without loss
of generality, p = (2 +
√
−3) and p = (2−
√
−3), where (7) = pp. The fundamental
unit for OQ(√−3),7 is


















violates the AAC conjecture since clearly −3 | 3. Although this is a counterexample,
one might question the validity that this is a true counterexample for the analogue
since the group of roots of unity for this field has order 6. To avoid this being a
complication since real quadratics have unit group of rank 1, we can take a fake real
quadratic that has a similar structure. Consider p = 347 with discriminant D = −7.
Then the fundamental unit for this particular fake real is
εQ(
√
−7),347 = 2 + 7
√
−7.
It is quite obvious that this violates the AAC conjecture, but avoid the earlier com-
plication since the unit group for OQ(√−7),347 has rank 1.
It appears the log log philosophy holds true for the fake real quadratic case. As
D varies with fixed p, the probability of failure is 1
D
, which is expected since there
is no reason why we believe D should not behave randomly. Cohen mentions that
no counterexamples have been found for p = 2, 3, 5, 11, 17, and 29, although this has
been only tested for a very small bound D < 1072000. Further analysis could be done
for these primes, but it would not be unreasonable to speculate that perhaps these
primes without counterexamples for very large D might inherently behave exactly as
real quadratic fields. It would be interesting to study these and see if there is any
substance to these unsupported claims.
To see more counterexamples, see Appendix D.
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Chapter 6
Number Field Cryptography Application
Public key cryptography is one of the main techniques for securing the Internet.
Although there are many symmetric key crypto-systems that are secure, they require
both parties to have the same key. Communicating this secure key over the Internet
is a difficult problem, which presents an issue on using symmetric key crypto-systems.
Most of the current public key crypto-systems, such as RSA, are based on seemingly
difficult computational problems in number theory such as factoring integers.
In 1988, Buchmann and Williams [2] presented a variant of the classical Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol using the class groups of imaginary quadratic fields.
Since then, there has been development in this field such as extending it to real
quadratic fields. There are also methods now to devise cryptographic protocols using
these fields [3].
In this chapter, we will give an overview of the key exchange protocol using the
ideal class group of fake real quadratic orders. This protocol is identical to the one
proposed by Buchmann and Williams proposed for imaginary quadratic fields with an
exception. As stated in previous sections, fake real quadratic orders have similar class
group structures to real quadratic fields. The algorithm discussed here gives another
way to use Buchmann and Williams key exchange but given a restriction on how the
ideals are chosen. This adds an additional bit of difficulty to the problem since the
class group used has a structure similiar to real quadratic fields rather than imaginary
quadratic ones. The security proof shows that using the correct procedure, the users
should expect reasonable protection of the key and another attempt to a solution for
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the key exchange problem. Therefore, we are able to accept the security proof given
by them, but we will also discuss the limitations and the cautions regarding the use
of this protocol with these fake reals.
6.1 Ideals of Imaginary Quadratic Fields
From Proposition 1.1, we saw that the map ϕ, defined by a 7→ aOK,p where a is
from the set of integral ideals of OK mapping to ideals of OK,p, is an isomorphism.
Therefore, we can look at the properties of a as an ideal of OK and develop the same
properties for the ideals of OK,p.
Before we develop these properties about the ideals in OK , we need to define some
of the terminology. This section is borrowed heavily from [2]. If α ∈ K, let the trace
of α is Tr(α) = α + α, and the norm of α is N(α) = αα, so that |α|2 = αα = N(α).
If α, β ∈ K, let [α, β] denote the set αZ+ βZ. Since K is an imaginary quadratic
field, OK = [1, ω], where








1 : D ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4)
2 : D ≡ 1 (mod 4)
Thus, α ∈ OK if and only if Tr(α) and N(α) are both in Z. The discriminant ∆ of
K is equal to (ω − ω)2 = 4D/r2.
Each integral principal ideal a of OK has the form




where a, b ∈ Z, 0 < a <
√
D, and 0 ≤ b < 2a. For shorthand, we denote
a = [a, b+ cω], (6.1)
where a, b, c ∈ Z, a > 0, and c > 0. We have c|a, c|b, and ac|N(b+ cω). In addition,
if a = [a, b + cω], where a, b, c ∈ Z, c|a, c|b, and ac|N(b + cω), then a is an ideal of
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OK . For a given ideal a, the value a is called the least positive rational integer in a,
and we denote it by L(a). We say an ideal a is primitive if it is not divisible by any
other ideal except by the trivial ideal (1). If an ideal is primitive, then c = 1.
The following lemmas are attributed to Buchmann and Williams, and are given
without proof. The proofs can be found in [2].
Lemma 6.1. (Buchmann, Williams) If a is any primitive ideal of OK, then there
exists some α ∈ a such that a = [L(a), α] and |Tr(α)| ≤ L(a).
The following lemma tells us that the value of |Tr(α)| is unique.
Lemma 6.2. (Buchmann, Williams) If a is an ideal of OK, α = [L(a), α] = [L(a), β],
and |Tr(α)| ≤ L(a), |Tr(β)| ≤ L(a), then |Tr(α)| = |Tr(β)|.
We call a a reduced ideal if a is primitive and there does not exist a β ∈ a such
that |β| < L(a). The following theorems tell us when a is a reduced ideal and some
properties of reduced ideals.
Theorem 6.3. (Buchmann, Williams) If a is a primitive ideal of OK and a =
[L(a), α] with |Tr(α)| ≤ L(a), then a is a reduced ideal if and only if |α| ≥ L(a).
Theorem 6.4. (Buchmann, Williams) If a is a reduced ideal of OK, then L(a) <√
|∆|/3.
Theorem 6.5. (Buchmann, Williams) If a is a primitive ideal of OK and L(a) <√
|∆|/2, then a is a reduced ideal of OK.
Lemma 6.6. (Buchmann, Williams) If a ∼ b, then there exists α ∈ a such that
(α)b = (L(b))a.
Finally, the next theorem gives us that there are at most two reduced ideals in
any given equivalence class of ideals.
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Theorem 6.7. (Buchmann, Williams) Let a, b be primitive ideals of OK where a =
[L(a), α] and b = [L(b), β] such that |Tr(a)| ≤ L(a) and |Tr(b)| ≤ L(b). If a ∼ b,
then L(a) = L(b) and |Tr(α)| = |Tr(β)|.
We will show in the section that each equivalence class of OK contains a single
reduced ideal. We will present Buchmann and Williams’s algorithm for recovering
this reduced ideal. This is equivalent to Gauss’s reduction theory.
6.2 Ideal Reduction (Found in [2])
This section will provide two algorithms to reduce primitive ideals. We note that if
a = [L(a), α] is a primitive ideal of OK , then the ideal b = [N(α)/L(a),−α] is also a
primitive ideal. Therefore,
(α)a = (L(a))b.
This means that a ∼ b.
Algorithm 6.8. 1. Given a primitive ideal a = a1 = [L(a), α] of OK. Define
Q0 = rL(a) > 0 and P0 = rα−
√
D ∈ Z. Recall that the value r is the same as
discussed in Section 6.1.
2. Compute the following: 
qi = Ne(Pi/Qi),






where Ne(η) is the nearest integer (i.e. |η−Ne(η)| ≤ 12). This is unique unless














is a reduced ideal of OK when
Qi+1 ≥ Qi.
Proof. The proof can be found in Buchmann and Williams paper in [2].
The computations in Algorithm 6.8 can be quite cumbersome, so the following
modification to the above provides a method for easier computations. Let T0 = |P0|,




Ri = remainder from dividing Ti by Qi.
Mi = Qi − 2Ri.
If Mi ≥ 0, then
Ti+1 = Ri,
Qi+1 = Qi−1 − si(Ri + Ti),
ti+1 = −ti,
while if Mi < 0, then
Ti+1 = Ri +Mi,
Qi+1 = Qi−1 − si(Ri + Ti) +Mi,
ti+1 = ti.
In this version, Pi from (6.2) is Pi = tiTi for all i ≥ 0.
The following theorem gives us a upper bound on the number of steps necessary
to reach a reduced ideal, ensuring that the algorithm gives us a reduced ideal every
time.
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Theorem 6.10. If a is given as in Algorithm 6.8, then we have Qi+1 ≥ Qi for some
i ≤ 2 + [12 log2(3Q0/5
√
|D|)].
With this theorem, we now have an algorithm that will give us a reduced ideal
every time. In the next section, we will discuss the key-exchange protocol.
6.3 Key Exchange Protocol
We will now discuss the key exchange protocol. Suppose that Alice and Bob would
like to exchange a key. Select a value of D such that |D| is large, approximately at
least 10200. As discussed, select an ideal a in OK,p where a is coprime to p. Both the
value of D and the ideal a can be made public.
1. Let Alice choose a random integer x. Alice computes ax ∼ b, where∼ represents
ideal equivalence discussed in Section 6.1. Alice sends b to Bob.
2. Bob selects a random integer y and computes ay = c. He sends c to Alice.
3. Alice computes the reduced ideal f̃1 ∼ cx.
4. Bob computes the reduced ideal f̃2 ∼ by.
Since
f̃1 ∼ cx ∼ (ay)x = (ax)y ∼ by ∼ f̃2,
Alice and Bob both have the same reduced ideal of OK,p. Therefore, by Theorem
6.7, we have that L(f̃1) = L(f̃2). Now, if both f̃1 = [L(f̃2), κ1] and f̃2 = [L(f̃2), κ2],
then |Tr(κ1)| = |Tr(κ2)|. Thus, Alice and Bob have the option to agree on whether
L(f̃1) = L(f̃2) or |Tr(κ1)| = |Tr(κ2)| to be the secret. Otherwise, they could agree on
certain parts of the above two options could be chosen to be the secret key.
There is a cautionary tale here as since L(f̃1)|N(κ1), L(f̃1) and Tr(κ1) are not
linearly independent, thus using parts of both could compromise the secret value of
the key.
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This key exchange system can be used as part of the public key crypto-system in
a similar manner designed by El Gamal [11]. If Alice intends to send Bob a secure
message, they would exchange keys as discussed above. Let L(̃f) be the key that has
been agreed upon between the two parties. Again, we emphasize that x is only known
to Alice, and y is only known to Bob. LetM = M1M2 . . .Mk be the plaintext message
Alice wishes to send to Bob, where Mi is a block corresponding to the bitlength of
the key chosen. Then the cipher text sent from Alice to Bob is
(M1 + L(̃f), b),
where b ∼ ax, and M1 is the first block of M and where the M1 < L(̃f). Each
subsequent block of M can be sent in a similar way, although for additional security,
Alice should select a new value of x for each block in Step 3 of the Key Exchange
Protocol.
To decipher the message, Bob must determine the value of L(̃f), but since they
have already exchanged keys, he has b ∼ ax and his secret value y. Thus, he recovers
the key by computing
by ∼ axy ∼ cx ∼ f̃,
thus allowing Bob to recover M1.
6.4 Security Proof
Security proofs for cryptosystems show that breaking the encryption via brute force
is computationally equivalent to a difficult problem, such as factorization of a large
number. We aim to show this version of the cryptosystem has similar difficulty as the
discrete log problem, which is believed to be difficult. One of the biggest drawbacks
to the described key exchange protocol is that the complexity is greater than El
Gamal’s system [11], which is an asymmetric encryption algorithm based on the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In addition, the bandwidth required is much greater.
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For example, in order to use a 100 digit key, Alice and Bob must communicate
200 digits of information. With the sacrifice of computational ease and increase of
bandwidth, it is apparent the security of this system should be greater than [11] for
increase in effort. Unfortunately, this crypto-system is not provably secure, but we
will give evidence that this system has the foundations of a secure system.
As stated before, the number of equivalence classes of ideal in OK,p is called the
class number and denoted by hK,p. If C1 and C2 are two of these equivalence classes,
then define the product C1C2 of these classes by
C3 = C1C2 = {c = ab|a ∈ C1, b ∈ C2}.
Since the ideals of OK form an Abelian group G of order hK , we have that the ideals
of OK,p form an Abelian group with the structure of G/〈p〉, which is consistent with
Proposition 1.3, noting the fact that the identity of this group is the class of principal
ideals.












and for any ε > 0,
hK > |D|1/2−ε
for sufficiently large D. By assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH),




12eγ log log |D| < hK <
2(1 + o(1))
√
|D| log log |D|
π
.
Thus, we would expect the value of hK to be approximately the same magnitude
as |D|1/2. Therefore, with the careful selection of prime p such that |D| is large and
(p) = pp such that o(p) is small, we have hK,p is large from Proposition 1.3. Therefore,
the class group of ideals of OK,p will be large enough.
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If Eve was attempting to attack Alice and Bob’s secure communication, she will
have access to the value of D, p, and the ideals a, b, and c. She will win the game if
she is able to recover either the secret value x or y. In order to do this is to figure out
the value of f̃1 or f̃2. One approach is to solve the discrete log problem in ClK /〈p〉.
In otherwords, given a reduced ideal a and reduced ideal b such that b ∼ ax, recover
the value x. Trying to find the value of x is quite a difficult problem. The best known
method to compute hK is O(|∆|1/4+ε) on average and O(|∆|1/5+ε) at best [2].
Although the difficulty of this problem is not entirely known, Shanks proved in
[22] that if there is an effective way to solve for x, then it will lead to an effective
method to recover the factors of D. Therefore, this lets us believe that the difficulty
of solving for x should be on a similar difficulty level as factoring a number. For more





In this section, we describe a brief outline of the infrastructure of the class group
of real quadratic fields followed by our desire of developing a similar notion for fake
real quadratics. The author recommends for people interested in reading more about
this topic are encouraged to view Jacobson and Scheidler’s Structure Inside the Class
Group of a Real Quadratic Field [16].
The infrastructure for real quadratic fields is the set of reduced principal ideals
that forms a group-like structure. Specifically, let {ai}ni=1 be the set of reduced ideals
in the class group of Q(
√
D), a real quadratic field. These ideals are equivalent giving
us the following relationship:
ai+1 = (ψi)ai.
The generators for the ideals ai and the values ψi are generated from intermediate
steps computing the continued fractions expansion for
√
D. This fact is especially
nice since otherwise finding these ideals would be a difficulty endeavor. Since the
ideals ai are principal, we can write them as ai = (θi), and we have the following





From this equality, we are able to say the distance between two ideals are
δ(ai+1, ai) = log(θi+1/θi) = logψi.
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Although these ideals do not form a group, they have a cyclic “group-like” struc-
ture. It should not be surprising that the reduced ideals generated from the continued
fractions expansion will start to repeat as quadratic irrationals have periodic expan-
sions. The best way to see this cyclic group-like structure is to place the ideals on a
circle, as seen in Figure 7.1 below.
Figure 7.1 The Infrastructure of the Class Group of Real Quadratic Fields
Image Credit to Jacobson and Scheidler [16]
Although the distance between any two ideals are not necessarily equal, the amaz-
ing part is the circumference of this circle is the regulator RD = log εD from Dirichlet’s
class number formula. The infrastructure is a powerful method to represent the class
group structure of a real quadratic field as it is easy to generate the reduced ideals




Since we believe the class group structure of fake real quadratics and real quadratic
fields are similar, we suspect an analogous infrastructure argument could exist. Al-
though a concerted effort was made to develop a comparable system, we fell short of
our goal. The first difficulty encountered was to find the reduced ideals for fake real
quadratics. For real quadratic fields, the reduced ideals could be found using con-
tinued fractions as discussed above. Another method to find these ideals employ the
use of all binary quadratic forms of discriminant D and use Gauss’s reduction theory.
In contrast, the only tools to find these ideals in the fake real quadratic order was
to perform an exhaustive search. This proved to be a laborious task. Furthermore,
it was never clear on whether all the reduced ideals were found as the number of
ideals in each cycle can widely vary. During this search, the question of whether an
equivalent continued fractions expansion was raised, and this idea will be discussed
in the next section.
Assuming that we had a complete set of reduced ideals, the next problem we
encountered was the desired sum of distances between ideals to be equal to regulator
RD,p = logp εD,p. Unfortunately, the sum of distances computed between the reduced
ideals never corresponded to the desired value RD,p in any discernible pattern. Con-
sidering this, it seemed apparent we needed a different approach to the development
of our infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the author is convinced that an infrastructure for the class group of
fake real quadratic orders should exist. It seems dubious for the class group structures
to be this similar yet fail to have an infrastructure counterpart. In addition, there
was no contrary evidence produced to convince the author otherwise.
7.2 Continued Fractions
As stated in the previous section, continued fractions expansion provide incredible
amounts of information for real quadratic fields Q(
√
D). For the infrastructure, it
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yields the generators for the reduced principal ideals along with all the necessary parts
to compute the regulator RD. Even more interesting, the expansion can produce the
fundamental unit εD for Q(
√
D). Thus, it would be desired to have an equivalent
expansion for fake real quadratic orders.
Both the infrastructure and the fundamental unit for Q(
√
D) rely on the periodic
nature of the continued fractions expansion for quadratic irrationals. Unfortunately,
the continued fractions algorithm is only defined for real numbers. Since fake real
quadratrics are complex algebraic structures, we must use another method to compute
such an expansion.
The search for a continued fraction expansion counterpart led us to p-adics. The
first major difficulty was to decide which process to use as many algorithms exist due
to the variety of “floor” definitions for the p-adics. For real numbers, the floor of
n ∈ R is the greatest integer part of n, denoted by bnc. In the p-adics, there is no
clear equivalent definition for the floor. They were often some variation of the p-adic
valuation of the number.
We were specifically looking for an expansion that was periodic. The only expan-
sion we encountered with this possibility was Justin Miller’s algorithm from his Ph.D.
dissertation [19]. He proved that quadratic irrationals were periodic in Q2 and Q3
and observed that many quadratic irrationals were periodic in Qp using his method.
Unfortunately, his expansion did not provide a similar notion of reduced ideals or a
fundamental unit for fake real quadratics. Recall from Chapter 2 that a fundamental
unit for OD,p should solve the Pell Equation
x2 −Dy2 = pk,
where k = o(p). As with most other p-adic continued fractions expansion, the nu-
merator and denominators of the convergents solved the Diophantine equation
x2 −Dy2 = zpk.
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It was observed that some of these expansion did solve the desired Pell equation, but
there seemed to be no discernible pattern on why this was true. After a while, it
seemed apparent that it was sheer coincidence that the expansion happen to solve
the Diophantine equation with z = 1. We attempted to isolate and understand if it
was possible to modify the algorithm to force z = 1 everytime. Unfortunately, we fell
short of our goal here as well as there was no strong evidence explaining why z = 1.
We hope to inspire the reader to pursue the development of an equivalent continued
fractions expansion for fake real quadratic orders.
7.3 Class Number Problem
It would be remiss if we did not mention an analogue to Gauss’s class number problem
in terms of fake real quadratics.
Conjecture 7.1. (O.) Let p be a fixed prime. Then there are infinitely many funda-





= 1 such that hK,p = 1.
It would be interesting to see if there was any logic argument why the element
in the class group ClK representing the element p would not behave randomly. One
of the largest hurdles for large |D| would be the difficulty of computing the order of
p in the class group ClK . This knowledge is required to compute the class number
hK,p. If there was an efficient method to compute the order, then one might be better
equipped to produce and study the class numbers generated for large |D|.
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Fundamental Unit Method 1 SAGE Code
The following code uses SAGE [24] to find the fudamental unit for a given p prime and
fundamental discriminant D < 0. The program follows Method 1 uses the following
steps:
1. Computes the class number h(D) for Q(
√
D).
2. Determines all divisors of h(D).
3. Iterates through all the divisors of h(D) starting from the smallest divisor and
determines if pk is represented by the binary quadratic form x2 −Dy2.
The smallest divisor k such that there exists a (x, y) satisfying the Pell equation
x2 −Dy2 = pk





import pylab as p
import matplotlib
import math
def class_number_frqf_precision(p, D, prec = 2):
‘‘‘Program searches through all possible divisors of the class
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number
Determines whether there is a solution to the Pell Equation
x^2 - D*y^2 = p*k, where k is the order of p in the class group
\n
Usage: \n
D: D < 0 \n




where x^2 - D*y^2 = p^k \n ’’’
# Checks to see if p is prime
if is_prime(p) == False:
return "ERROR> " + str(p) + " is not a prime number."
# Checks to see if D is a negative value
elif D >= 0:
return "ERROR> D should be < 0."
# Checks to see if D is a square modulo p
elif legendre_symbol(D, p) != 1:
return "ERROR> " + str(D) + " is not a quadratic residue
modulo " + str(p) + "."
elif is_prime(-D) != True or (-D%4) != 3:
return "ERROR> " + str(D) + " is not a prime or -D not
\equiv 3 (mod 4)."




# p O_K = \mathfrak{p} \bar{\mathfrak{p}}, let A = \mathfrak{p}
A = K.factor(p)[0][0]
# value holds the value for the order of \mathfrak{p} in Class
# Group of K
value = 0
# creation of PARI number field
bnf = A.number_field().pari_bnf()
# goes through every possible divisor of the class number
for k in h.divisors():
# temp holds the possible ideal, checks whether to see if it
# is principal
temp = A**k
# if temp is principal, then break, otherwise, check next
# divisor
pari_ideal_challenge = bnf.bnfisprincipal(temp.pari_hnf(), prec)
if sum(list(pari_ideal_challenge)) == 0:
value = k
break
# Return D, p, h_{K,p}, h_K, ord(p) in Cl(K), fundamental
# unit
return D, p, h/value, h, value, (A**value).gens_reduced()[0]
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Appendix B
Fundamental Unit Method 2 SAGE Code
The following code uses SAGE [24] to determine the fundamental unit for the fake
real quadratic order generated by prime p and the fundamental discriminant D < 0.
The SAGE code listed here uses the method described in Section 2.2, where the order
of the class group of the fake real quadratic is determined by binary quadratic forms
and through matrix reduction delivers the fundamental unit.
The function binary_quadratic_order(D,p) uses the built in functionality of
SAGE to determine the order of the prime fractional ideal p where (p) = pp in ClK ,
the class group of the imaginary quadratic field K = Q(
√
D).
The function square_root_mod(n,p) computes the square root of r modulo p, or
solutions to
x2 ≡ r (mod p)
using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm discusses in Section 2.4.
The function quadratic_nonresidue(p) scans the set {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, starting
from 0 increments by 1, stopping when it has found a quadratic non-residue. This
function is necessary for the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm. Returns a quadratic non-
residue.
During the process of computing the order of the ideal p, we need to check whether
or not each power of the given binary quadratic form is equivalent to the principal
binary quadratic field. If the D is not either 0 or 1 (mod 4), then the principal
binary quadratic form has not been implemented.
The following function reduces a given binary quadratic form Q = (a, b, c) with
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discriminant D so that it satisifies |b| ≤ a < c. It is programmed to do the following:










where (A,B,C) represents the reduced principal binary quadratic form with discrim-
inant D.
The function delta_value(b,c,D) is used in conjuction with the previous func-
tion BinaryQF_reduction_matrix(Q). The transformation matrix has the form0 −1
1 δ

where δ ∈ Z is the value that satisfies
| − b+ 2cδ| ≤ c,
where b and c are from the binary quadratic form (a, b, c) in which it is being reduced.
This function will find the δ value necessary for the step of reduction that will reduce
the binary quadratic form.
def binary_quadratic_order(D, p):
’’’This program uses binary quadratic forms
with the built-in functionality of SAGE to
determine the order of \mathfrak{p} in the
class group Cl(K) where K = Q(\sqrt{D}).
Also will return the fundamental unit for
the fake real quadratic field O_{K,p} where
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K is the imaginary quadratic field defined
the same as above.\n
\n
\n
D: the D value for Q(\sqrt{D}) \n
p: the prime that creates the fake real quadratic’’’
# Check whether D is a square modulo p
if legendre_symbol(D,p) != 1:
return "ERROR> " + str(D) + " is not a square modulo " + str(p)
# Compute the binary quadratic form with disc D
# with leading coefficient p.
# Quadratic Form (a,b,c) = (p,b,c)
# leading coefficient
a = p
# computing b and c value
square_root_values = square_root_mod(D, p)
c = (int(square_root_values[0])**2 - D)/(4*a)




c = (b**2 - D)/(4*a)
# creation of the binary quadratic form of disc D
# with leading coefficient p
Q = BinaryQF([a,b,c])




# Checks to make sure principal QF is sane
if type(P) == str:
return "ERROR> Not Implemented Yet."
# variable to keep track of order
order = 1
# temp variable to hold the current binary
# QF in question
temp = Q
# loop until Q is the principal form
while temp.is_equivalent(P) == False:
temp *= Q
order += 1
# compute the reduction matrix and fundamental unit
data = BinaryQF_reduction_matrix(temp)
# returns the fundamental unit, order of \mathfrak{p}
# in class group K, binary quadratic form, and
# reduction matrix
return data[2], order, temp, data[1]
def square_root_mod(n, p):
’’’This program computes the square root of r modulo p
and returns the two solution. Uses the Tonelli-Shanks
algorithm.’’’
# checks that r is a square modulo p
if legendre_symbol(n, p) != 1:
return "ERROR> " + str(n) + " is not a square modulo " + str(p)




# Retrieve a quadratic non-residue modulo p
z = quadratic_nonresidue(p)
# Define the following values for R, t, and M
R = mod(n**((Q+1)/2), p)
t = mod(n**Q, p)
M = S
# Set value of c
c = mod(z**Q, p)
# checks the first step of the loop
if t == 1:
return R, p-R
# iterate over the following loop
while t != 1:




while end_condition == True:




b = mod(c**(2**(M-i-1)), p)
# Set the following congruences
R = mod(R*b, p)
62
t = mod(t*(b**2), p)




’’’This program finds a random element in {0,1,...,p-1}
that is a non-residue and returns it.’’’
# Starts at the beginning of the set and searches for a
# quadratic non-residue
for i in xrange(p-1):
# checks to see if a quadratic non-residue
if legendre_symbol(i,p) == -1:
# returns quadratic non-residue
return i
def BinaryQF_principal(D):
’’’Returns the reduced principal binary quadratic
forms with discriminant D.’’’
if D%4 == 0:
return BinaryQF([1,0,-D/4])
elif D%4 == 1:
return BinaryQF([1,1,-(D-1)/4])
else:
return "ERROR> Not Implemented Yet."
def BinaryQF_reduction_matrix(Q):
’’’This program attempts to reduce a binary quadratic
form Q = (a,b,c). While it reduces, it keeps track of
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the reduction matrices used and produces the entire
matrix at the end.’’’
# Converts from SAGE BinaryQF type to list
L = list(Q)
# Creation of Binary Quadratic Field
K = QuadraticField(Q.discriminant(), ’a’)
# stores all the ideal necessary
reduction_BQF = []
reduction_BQF.append((-L[1]+K(’a’))/(2*L[0]))
# list delta holds all delta values (matrix entry 2,2)
# used to transform matrix
delta = []
# Loops to see if L is reduced (without using built
# in functionality
# loop while binary quadratic form is not reduced
while (abs(L[1]) <= L[0] < L[2]) == False:
# find the new b and new c value along with delta
temp = delta_value(L[1], L[2], Q.discriminant())
# append the compute delta value in temp into list
delta.append(temp[0])








# creation of the identity 2x2 matrix
M = Matrix.identity(2)
# for each d in delta value
for d in delta:
# create the transformation matrix for that
# step of reduction
temp = Matrix([[0,-1],[1,d]])
# multiply it to the product of all these
# transformation matrices
M *= temp
# Computes the fundamental unit
fund_unit = 1
for j in xrange(len(reduction_BQF)-1):
fund_unit *= reduction_BQF[j]
fund_unit = fund_unit**(-1)
# return reduction transformation matrix, its inverse,
# multiplied by -1,
# the list of BQF involved with reduction
return M, -M.inverse(), fund_unit
def delta_value(b, c, D):
’’’Compute the valid delta value used to transform
matrix to reduce a binary quadratic form.’’’
# start at the smallest d (i.e. delta) value
d = 0
# starting value of the new b
new_b = -b + 2*c*d
# counter to decide which value of d to try
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# allow alternation between plus or minus d
counter = 0
while (abs(new_b) <= c) == False:
# when counter is even, increase the
# magnitude of delta by +1
# find the new b value and recheck if
# it works
if counter%2 == 0:
d = abs(d) + 1
counter += 1
new_b = -b + 2*c*d
# when counter is odd, check the
# negative form of delta, find the




new_b = -b + 2*c*d
# once a valid new b value has been found
# compute the new c value
new_c = (D - new_b**2)/(-4*c)
# return the delta value, new b, and new c








We fell short of our goal for showing an analogous statement, but we list here the
code developed in the attempt to generate data and trendlines.
The code listed here uses SAGE [24] to perform a handful of tasks that provide
data for fake real quadratic orders. The function neg_disc_range generates a list of
negative fundamental discriminants in the range [-D, -2), unless a different value for
the lower bound is specified other than −2.
The function class_number_prec_scanner take a given list of negative funda-




= 1), it computes the class number for the fake real quadratic order OK,p where
K = Q(
√
D). It will record the frequency of each instance of a class number for each
prime and write it out to a file.
The function class_number_one_scanner operates similarly to the
class_number_prec_scanner, except checks only to see if the class number for the
fake real quadratic order is one. If the class number is one, then it will write it to the
file.
For the function fake_real_hooley, it takes a list of primes and functional dis-





This function aims to see if there is a visual analogue to the Hooley conjecture for
fake real quadratic orders. It will plot the data for a specified number of partial sums
on a graph.
The function class_number_formula is used to compute the class number using
the class number fomrula rather than the brute force methods listed in Method 1
and Method 2. Unfortunately, since there is not an efficient way to compute the
fundamental unit, it still requires some data to be computed using Method 1.
The function class_number_formula_scanner uses the function
class_number_formula function. Given a list of primes and fundamental discrimi-
nants, the function will produce a file that contains all valid combinations of p and
D and the class number for the fake real quadratic order that is produced by them.
The goal is the data can be post-processed in order to identify additional patterns.
def neg_disc_range(D, lower_bound = -2):
’’’Returns a list that contains all fundamental negative
discriminants in the range [-D, lower_bound). ’’’
if D <= -lower_bound:
print "ERROR> Upper bound must be a postive value greater
than", -lower_bound
return
# Create list that will hold all negative fundamental discriminants
disc_list = [0] * D
# atomic counter to keep track of which entry of the disc_list to
save valid values
counter = 0




for i in xrange(-D, lower_bound):
if is_fundamental_discriminant(i) == True:
disc_list[counter] = i
counter += 1




filename_raw, nth_prime_start = 1, lower_bound_disc = -2, print_out
= False, class_number_upperbound = 10**4, prec = 2):
# Creates the list of primes based on the inputs
P = primes_first_n(nth_prime_end)[nth_prime_start:]
# Creates the list of negative fundamental discriminants based on
the inputs
# D = neg_disc_range(upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
D = xrange(-upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
# Creation of the file, in write mode
filename = str(filename_raw) + ".txt"
open_file = open(filename, ’w’)
# Creation of the csv writer for the given filename
spamwriter = csv.writer(open_file)
spamwriter.writerow(["Primes number " + str(nth_prime_start) +
" to " + str(nth_prime_end) + ", Discriminants in range " +
str(lower_bound_disc-1) + " through " + str(-upper_bound_disc)])
# Scan through each prime, range through each disc, and print to
file class number
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for p in P:
# writes the current prime out to file
spamwriter.writerow([str(p)])
# array keeps track of the number of each class number for a
given prime
class_number_array = numpy.zeros(class_number_upperbound)
# counter keeps track of total number of frqf for a given
prime
counter = 0
# Goes through each negative disc in given range
for d in D:
# retrieves the class number h_{K,p}
data = class_number_frqf_precision(p, d, prec = 2)
# If there is an error is the prime/discriminant combo,
continue
if type(data) == str:
continue
# Else, print out to screen or file, pending on command
options
else:
# counts each negative disc for a given prime
counter += 1
if print_out == True:
spamwriter.writerow(["disc: " + str(d) + "
, h_{K,p} = " + str(int(data[0])), data[1], data[2]])
# For each class number, add one to the counter
class_number_array[int(data[0])] += 1
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# For each non-zero entry, print to file
for i in (class_number_array.nonzero())[0]:
# Print to file each class number and its number of
occurences
spamwriter.writerow(["Class number: " + str(i) + ",
Number of Occurences: " + str(int(class_number_array[i]))])





filename_raw, nth_prime_start = 1, lower_bound_disc = -2,
print_out = False, class_number_upperbound = 10**4):
# Creates the list of primes based on the inputs
P = primes_first_n(nth_prime_end)[nth_prime_start:]
# Creates the list of negative fundamental discriminants based
on the inputs
D = neg_disc_range(upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
# Creation of the file, in write mode
filename = str(filename_raw) + ".txt"
open_file = open(filename, ’w’)
# Creation of the csv writer for the given filename
spamwriter = csv.writer(open_file)
spamwriter.writerow(["Primes number " + str(nth_prime_start) +
" to " + str(nth_prime_end) + ", Discriminants in range " +
str(lower_bound_disc-1) + " through " + str(-upper_bound_disc)])
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# Scan through each prime, range through each disc, and print to
file class number
for p in P:
# writes the current prime out to file
spamwriter.writerow([str(p)])
# creates two counters. one for class number one, and one
for total number of frqf
counter_one = 0
counter_frqf = 0
# Goes through each negative disc in given range
for d in D:
# retrieves the class number h_{K,p}
data = class_number_frqf(p, d)
# If there is an error is the prime/discriminant combo,
continue
if type(data) == str:
continue
# Else, print out to screen or file, pending on command
options
else:
# Counts each valid frqf
counter_frqf += 1
if print_out == True:
spamwriter.writerow(["disc: " + str(d) + ",
h_{K,p} = " + str(int(data[0]))])
# If class number one, add to counter. Otherwise,
go to next disc
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# Print to file each class number and its number of occurences
spamwriter.writerow(["Total class number 1: " +





filename_raw, nth_prime_start = 1, lower_bound_disc = -2,
print_out = False, class_number_upperbound = 10**4, prec = 2):
# Creates the list of primes based on the inputs
P = primes_first_n(nth_prime_end)[nth_prime_start:]
# Creates the list of negative fundamental discriminants based on
the inputs
# D = neg_disc_range(upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
D = xrange(-upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
# Creation of the file, in write mode
filename = str(filename_raw) + ".txt"
open_file = open(filename, ’w’)
# Creation of the csv writer for the given filename
spamwriter = csv.writer(open_file)
spamwriter.writerow(["Primes number " + str(nth_prime_start) +
" to " + str(nth_prime_end) + ", Discriminants in range "
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+ str(lower_bound_disc-1) + " through " + str(-upper_bound_disc)])
# Scan through each prime, range through each disc, and print to
file class number
for p in P:
# writes the current prime out to file
spamwriter.writerow([str(p)])
# array keeps track of the number of each class number for
a given prime
class_number_array = numpy.zeros(class_number_upperbound)
# counter keeps track of total number of frqf for a given
prime
counter = 0
# Goes through each negative disc in given range
for d in D:
# retrieves the class number h_{K,p}
data = class_number_frqf_precision(p, d, prec = 2)
# If there is an error is the prime/discriminant combo,
continue
if type(data) == str:
continue
# Else, print out to screen or file, pending on command
options
else:
# counts each negative disc for a given prime
counter += 1
if print_out == True:
spamwriter.writerow(["disc: " + str(d) + ",
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h_{K,p} = " + str(int(data[0])), data[1], data[2]])
# For each class number, add one to the counter
class_number_array[int(data[0])] += 1
# For each non-zero entry, print to file
for i in (class_number_array.nonzero())[0]:
# Print to file each class number and its number of
occurences
spamwriter.writerow(["Class number: " + str(i) + ",
Number of Occurences: " + str(int(class_number_array[i]))])




def fake_real_hooley(nth_prime_end, upper_bound_disc, filename_raw,
nth_prime_start = 1, lower_bound_disc = -2, class_number_upperbound
= 10**4, prec = 2):
# Creates the list of primes based on the inputs
P = primes_first_n(nth_prime_end)[nth_prime_start:]
# Creates the list of negative fundamental discriminants based
on the inputs
# D = neg_disc_range(upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
D = xrange(-upper_bound_disc, lower_bound_disc)
# Creation of the file, in write mode
filename = str(filename_raw) + ".txt"
# Create the filename for the picture
filename_pic = str(filename_raw) + "_hooley.png"
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# Open text file name is write mode
open_file = open(filename, ’w’)
# Creation of the csv writer for the given filename
spamwriter = csv.writer(open_file)
spamwriter.writerow(["Primes number " + str(nth_prime_start)
+ " to " + str(nth_prime_end) + ", Discriminants in range " +
str(lower_bound_disc-1) + " through " + str(-upper_bound_disc)])
# Creation of the x-axis for the plot
X = [i for i in xrange(upper_bound_disc)]
# Creation of the primary plot
fig = p.figure(figsize = (20, 15), dpi = 500)
# Creation of the actual subplot on the graph
ax = fig.add_subplot(1, 1, 1)
# x-axis label
ax.set_xlabel("Disc < " + str(upper_bound_disc))
# y-axis label
ax.set_ylabel("H(p, X)")
# Set plot Title
ax.set_title("Hooley Data for Fake Real")
# Specify the colors for plot
colors = [’b’, ’g’, ’r’, ’c’, ’m’, ’y’, ’k’, ’w’]
# Specify the two markers






# prime array to hold labels
prime_label_array = [0] * len(P)
for i in len(P):
prime_label_array[i] = [’subplot_’ + str(P[i]), str(P[i]),
’placeholder’]
# Holds the interval for each sample
interval = int(len(D)*.05)
# Scan through each prime, range through each disc, and print to
file class number
for p in P:
# if loop to advance the counter





# array keeps track of the number of each class number for
a given prime
class_number_array = numpy.zeros(class_number_upperbound)
# counter keeps track of total number of frqf for a given
prime
counter = 0
# Goes through each negative disc in given range
for j in len(D):
# retrieves the class number h_{K,p}
data = class_number_frqf_precision(p, D[j], prec = 2)
# If there is an error is the prime/discriminant combo,
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continue
if type(data) == str:
continue
# Else, print out to screen or file, pending on command
options
else:
# counts each negative disc for a given prime
counter += 1
# For each class number, add one to the counter
class_number_array[int(data[0])] += 1
if j % interval == 0:
sum = 0
for i in (class_number_array.nonzero())[0]:
sum += i*class_number_array[i]
# For each non-zero entry, print to file
sum = 0






# Produce data for seeing the class number is possible
data = class_number_frqf_precision(p, D)
if type(data) == str:








# Creation of filename
filename = "disc" + str(D) + "_" + str(number_of_primes)
+ "primes.txt"
# Open text file name is write mode
open_file = open(filename, ’w’)
# Creation of the csv writer for the given filename
spamwriter = csv.writer(open_file)
spamwriter.writerow(["disc","prime", "h(disc,p)", "h(disc)",
"order", "fundamental unit", "log of abs value fund unit",
"order | by log abs fund unit", "log of norm fund unit",
"order | log norm fund unit"])
# list of primes
P = primes_first_n(number_of_primes)[1:]
# range through all the possible primes
for p in P:
data = class_number_formula_data(p, D)













We list additional counterexamples to the AAC Conjecture. For each given p and
D, we give the fundamental unit that violates the AAC conjecture for the fake real
quadratic field OK,p, where K = Q(
√
D). The counterexamples were found by Henri
Cohen, and the fundamental units were generated by the SAGE program found in
Appendix A.
——————————————
p = 31, D = −3


































p = 859, D = −3





p = 859, D = −23




p = 859, D = −311




p = 859, D = −664019
ε = 2715865657163776661969863350960805704931689149160409811094660190991644
96105003790497073622673924157452038256356492548775268231060960384424777569
82
00188689141850204949770980041206371716580597726461923710673465619512626012
00891064941054633959899498078993114370122334195307491255675192035443342866
75955304150722991423629007961444004187324701227103868388462735959661401242
52604108776070654158471209101645537285705224153319389256425198686008428783
41780032−5017091603064165709326542003129091509578925424656226653896532679
70260009550646031766192364654852662551703430253040249829239450871739427419
26728696711170043146894121716563556197166155703499336613446016209895711991
97565677131406689375766243729219051594124974055655424573836426931099953760
44374077307074727256519828860606834860526854813486708456129403718303002743
33907783770670894697009152672166271873742931761639400782258756655926197725
517034565 ·
√
−664019
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